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NOTE 
Recidivist Sentencing and the Sixth Amendment 
Benjamin E. Adams* 
INTRODUCTION 
A recidivist is someone who engages in criminal behavior after a prior 
criminal conviction.1 “All jurisdictions impose harsher penalties on recidivists—a 
practice termed the ‘Recidivist Sentencing Premium.’”2 Two decades ago, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a court may increase a defendant’s penalty under a 
recidivist sentencing enhancement scheme without proving the fact of that 
defendant’s prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.3 Following that 
decision, the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey held that the Sixth Amendment 
requires any fact that increases the penalty to which a defendant is exposed to be 
found by a jury.4 Yet the Apprendi Court preserved recidivism as a “narrow 
exception to the general rule,” holding that the fact of prior convictions can still be 
found by a judge at the sentencing phase, rather than by a jury.5 
This exception in cases of recidivist sentencing was meant to respect a prior 
decision, Old Chief v. United States,6 which recognized that the nature or even the 
name of prior offenses for which a defendant has been convicted can be prejudicial.7 
Juries may be inclined to punish a defendant for prior conduct—rather than the 
current charge—if evidence of past crimes were to be presented at trial.8 As such, if 
 
*  J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2020; Editor-in-Chief, Indiana Journal of Law & 
Social Equality, Volume 8. The Author thanks Professor Jessica M. Eaglin for her invaluable 
guidance in composing this Note, the IJLSE Editorial Board members for their confidence and 
competence, and ATA for her unflagging support.  
1  Recidivist, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
2  JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS 2–3 (2008). 
3  Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).  
4  530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
5  Id. 
6  519 U.S. 172, 174 (1997) (holding that a prosecutor must accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate to 
prior offenses in order to avoid jury prejudice).  
7  Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 235 (“Even if a defendant's stipulation were to keep the name 
and details of the previous offense from the jury, jurors would still learn, from the indictment, 
the judge, or the prosecutor, that the defendant had committed an aggravated felony [without 
the exception].”) (citation omitted). It is not this Note’s position that the prior convictions 
exception itself will be eliminated, simply that the type of scheme devised by New York is 
unacceptable. For the broader argument, see Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior Convictions: 
Managing the Demise of the Prior Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 67 SMU L. REV. 577 (2014); 
Meg E. Sawyer, Note, The Prior Convictions Exception: Examining the Continuing Viability of 
Almendarez-Torres Under Alleyne, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409 (2015). 
8  Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180–81 (noting the likelihood that the jury might “generaliz[e] a 
 





a legislative body seeks to establish a sentencing enhancement based on recidivism 
—including an analysis of the nature of the prior offenses and the history of the 
defendant—how can the competing interests be reconciled? 
This is the dilemma New York currently faces. Its persistent felony offender 
statute requires two steps: first, the fact of the defendant’s two qualifying predicate 
felonies must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and second, the judge must find 
that the nature of the prior offenses or the defendant’s history and character are 
such that an extended sentence with lifetime supervision would be in the public 
interest.9 This statute has been challenged for its constitutionality multiple times 
since Apprendi was handed down,10 most recently in People v. Garvin,11 which was 
denied certiorari by the Supreme Court in October 2018.12 The Court of Appeals of 
New York has consistently held that the “sole determinant” and the “necessary and 
sufficient” condition for the defendant to be exposed to the greater penalty is the 
fact of the prior convictions; the further findings on the nature of the prior offenses, 
the history and character of the defendant, and extended punishment in the public 
interest are merely traditional exercises of discretion.13 
The New York courts’ interpretation of the persistent felony offender statute 
is unreasonable, as the statute plainly requires the nature and history findings to 
be made by a judge before imposing the enhanced sentence. This Note argues that 
the Supreme Court owes no deference to this interpretation simply because it was 
made by New York’s highest court.14 Part I briefly examines theoretical 
justifications for recidivist sentencing schemes. Part II explores the Supreme 
Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III discusses the New York 
statute and the case law that has arisen from it while providing comparison to other 
states’ responses to the dictates of Apprendi. Finally, Part IV argues that the 
Supreme Court should take up the next challenge to this statute in order to fulfill a 
 
defendant's earlier bad act into bad character and tak[e] that as raising the odds that he did the 
later bad act now charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction even if he should 
happen to be innocent momentarily)”). This problem had been recognized for decades even before 
the Supreme Court took it up in Old Chief. Anthony M. Radice, Recidivist Procedures: Prejudice 
and Due Process, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 337 (1967-1968) (discussing the prejudicial influence of 
prior convictions on juries in an era before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
9  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 2018); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 400.20 (McKinney 2018). 
10  See People v. Prindle, 80 N.E.3d 1026 (N.Y. 2017) cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 514 (2017); People v. 
Quinones, 906 N.E.2d 1033 (N.Y. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 821 (2009); People v. Rivera, 833 
N.E.2d 194 (N.Y. 2005); People v. Rosen, 752 N.E.2d 844 (N.Y. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 899 
(2001). 
11  88 N.E.3d 319 (N.Y. 2017). 
12  Garvin v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 57 (2018). 
13  Rivera, 833 N.E.2d at 197, 199 (quoting Rosen, 752 N.E.2d at 847). 
14  Though discussed further below in Part IV, infra, the general rule that the Supreme Court defers 
to a state’s highest court on the construction of state statutes is a longstanding one and can be 
found throughout much of the case law, but the Court has also consistently reinforced in such 
cases that it “is the final arbiter of whether the Federal Constitution necessitate[s] the 
invalidation of a state law.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982). 





promise made in Apprendi: that criminal defendants will always be afforded the 
right to have any fact which exposes them to increased punishment proved to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
I. THEORIES BEHIND RECIDIVIST PUNISHMENT 
Recidivism is a fairly recent penological problem, as even low-level crimes 
were met with potentially lethal punishments in the era before a reforming mindset 
took hold.15 “If the larceny of twelve pence is met by hanging, . . . there is 
remarkably little scope for the development of any class of habitual recidivists.”16 
Even for those who escaped the gallows once, a first offense would likely result in 
branding with special marks, making them easily identifiable and likely not spared 
the second time.17 During the Revolutionary Era and across the founding 
generation, those who crafted the new American republic sought to change these 
draconian punishments.18 These reform movements spread in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, imbued with the spirit of rehabilitating offenders, punishing 
their minds through incarceration rather than their bodies through corporal 
punishment.19 As a result, “this unexpected consequence of reform—the presence of 
the habitual criminal,” became a problem in need of solving.20 
History aside, the question of why we choose to punish repeat offenders more 
harshly remains. Because punishment involves some form of violence or duress 
inflicted on an offender, philosophers and criminologists have long examined the 
means by which a society chooses to justify inflicting punishment.21 The generally 
accepted theoretical justifications for punishment in the United States are: 
 
15  Daniel Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 99 (1971) 
(“[W]hile there were unquestionably habitual criminals [in the pre-reform period], there were 
few whose careers were not ended by a first conviction.”). 
16  NORVAL MORRIS, THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 18 (1951).  
17  Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF 
THE PRISON 44, 48 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1998). 
18  Jefferson and other leaders drew up plans for liberalizing the harsh penal codes of the 
colonial period, which had relied on bodily punishments of whipping, mutilation, and 
especially execution. . . . In the larger and less intimate worlds in which people now lived, 
public punishments based on shame seemed less meaningful. Instead, the criminals should 
be made to feel their individual guilt, by being confined in prisons. . . . Nowhere else in the 
Western world, as enlightened philosophes recognized, had such reforms been carried as 
far as they had in America. 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 193 (Vintage Books 1993) 
(1991). 
19  See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1975). 
20  Katkin, supra note 15. 
21  See, e.g., Antony Duff & Zachary Hoskins, Legal Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Fall 
2018 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/legal-punishment/. 





deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, restitution, and rehabilitation.22 Once a 
central principle of punishment theory, “rehabilitation has lost its position of 
preeminence almost everywhere, but has hardly disappeared from view.”23 Yet, as a 
logical matter, recidivist enhancements cannot have a rehabilitative function.24 In 
fact, recidivist sentencing has been justified as anti-rehabilitative punishment for 
those who have proven themselves unable to change their purportedly inherent 
criminality.25 Restitution, too, cannot logically survive as a justification if a repeat 
offender is prevented from gainful employment by incarceration.26 
As a result of this supposed inability of the repeat offender to reform or 
provide restitution, a sense arises that “society is not protected from the habitual 
criminal by normal criminal sanctions.”27 This creates a need to find justification for 
recidivist punishment through one of the remaining theories. Sweeping broadly, 
there is generally a division between “consequentialist” or utilitarian punishment 
theories (deterrence and incapacitation), and “non-consequentialist” theory 
 
22  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING § 18-2.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994). 
23  Id. § 18-2.1 cmt. at 13 (“As recently as the 1960s and early 1970s, rehabilitation was the 
prevailing theory of sentencing and corrections, and was the principal justification for the 
traditional structure of indeterminate sentences and parole.” (citing SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR 
JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 176, 244 (1980))). Additionally, a federal 
statute admonishes judges to remember “that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 
promoting correction and rehabilitation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2018); see also Tapia v. United 
States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011) (holding that the Sentencing Reform Act codified at § 3582 prohibits 
courts from lengthening a prison term for rehabilitative purposes). 
24  See ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 36 (“[I]t is clear that rehabilitation cannot justify a recidivist 
premium which consists of imposing a harsher or more intrusive sentence each time the offender 
is reconvicted.”). 
25  This theory of recidivism animated criminology for much of the twentieth century. See, e.g., 
MORRIS, supra note 16, at 17–20. 
26  Notably, a recent study suggests that offenders ordered to pay restitution to their victims may 
ultimately have lower rates of recidivism as a result. See R. Barry Ruback, Lauren K. Knoth, 
Andrew S. Gladfelter & Brendan Lantz, Restitution Payment and Recidivism: An Experimental 
Analysis, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 789, 807 (2018) (“The results of our analyses indicated 
that paying economic sanctions, which almost always went toward the court-ordered restitution, 
significantly lowered recidivism. In addition, we found that providing offenders with information 
about their outstanding economic sanctions both reduced recidivism and induced additional 
payments of economic sanctions.”). However, as the authors of this study note, previous research 
on the topic has shown the difficulty of examining the causal and correlative relationships 
between recidivism and restitution, suggesting that further study and replication on a larger 
scale are necessary. Id. at 794, 808–09. Regardless, the logical point stands that extended 
incarceration prevents offenders from earning the money necessary to provide restitution to their 
victims. Moreover, surveys of crime victims and public opinion generally show that there is little 
appetite for extending restorative justice and restitution models to recidivists. See, e.g., ROBERTS, 
supra note 2, at 44.  
27  MORRIS, supra note 16, at 20. Though the supposed “recidivist character” is often discussed in 
terms of violent crime, for an extension of the argument and the associated “antisocial 
personality disorder” into the realm of financial crimes and securities fraud, see Jayne W. 
Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 189, 193 (2008). 





(retribution).28 As the demarcation suggests, the former theories look forward to 
some greater goal served by punishment, such as how it helps society or the 
offender’s future; while the latter theory looks backward and sees punishment as 
justice for a wrong done, irrespective of any future result.29 
A. Retributivists 
With their focus on justice, retributivists have a complicated relationship 
with recidivist punishment. As a basic matter, theories based in retribution argue 
that those who commit crimes deserve punishment (the enabling theory of “positive” 
retribution), but they only deserve punishment in proportion to the crimes 
committed (the limiting theory of “negative” retribution).30 Under the basic form of 
either the positive or negative view, though, an offender is punished only for the 
crime they have committed, not for who they are; the punishment is calibrated to 
reflect blame for a single act.31 Therefore, retributive theorists who focus on what 
an offender deserves—that is, “desert-based” retribution—have struggled to 
reconcile the impulse to punish recidivists with harsher penalties.32  
Supporters of desert-based retribution recognize that proportionality between 
offense and offender is called into question by recidivist enhancements.33 This is 
possibly best exemplified by the Supreme Court’s handling of California’s “three 
strikes” law in the case of Ewing v. California, where the theft of a few golf clubs led 
to a sentence of twenty-five years to life.34 California’s argument was that the law 
served retributive purposes, and that the repeat offender incurs more blame and 
culpability than a first-time offender; it was only at oral argument that the State 
abandoned this position under pressure from the Court, in favor of a rationale based 
on incapacitation.35  
Some desert theorists have argued that rather than seeing greater 
punishment for recidivists as an enhancement at all, we should regard recidivist 
 
28  See, e.g., MARK TUNICK, PUNISHMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 67–69 (1992). 
29  Id.  
30  See TUNICK, supra note 28, at 74; Duff & Hoskins, supra note 21. 
31  See ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 52. 
32  See ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, DESERVED CRIMINAL SENTENCES 72 (2017).  
33  See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE 
PRINCIPLES 85 (2005) (“The larger the recidivist premium becomes, the more this conflicts with 
the proportionality principle's requirement that the seriousness of the conviction offence should 
be the main determinant.”). For the argument that retributive theory should lead to the 
conclusion that recidivists deserve less punishment than novice offenders, see Thomas Søbirk 
Petersen, Less for Recidivists? Why Retributivists Have a Reason to Punish Repeat Offenders Less 
Harshly than First-time Offenders, in RECIDIVIST PUNISHMENTS: THE PHILOSOPHER'S VIEW 
(Claudio Tamburrini & Jesper Ryberg eds., 2011). 
34  538 U.S. 11, 18–20 (2003). 
35  See Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1293, 1317 (2006); see also infra text accompanying notes 47–49. 





punishment as the standard from which penalties for first-time offenders depart.36 
The main form of this model is one in which first-time offenders get a “discount” on 
their punishment, and that discount decreases as they commit more crimes; this is 
known as the “progressive loss of mitigation” model.37 This approach may be the 
closest to explaining New York’s persistent felony offender enhancement,38 as it 
relies on an examination of “the nature and seriousness of the offending,” in 
addition to the fact of the past crimes.39 This theory flies in the face of many 
scholars’ basic retributive theory, which “accords no role for previous convictions at 
sentencing,” because the fact of having committed a previous crime has no bearing 
on the present crime.40 
Yet according to other retributive theories, persistent offenders are 
inherently more culpable for their crimes, either because they have ignored 
previous sanctions for their behavior, or because they repeatedly disregard the 
rights of others in committing their crimes.41 Nonetheless, critics have long 
questioned the viability of a retributive theory that rests on the increased 
culpability of repeat offenders.42 
B. Utilitarians 
In large part, modern criminal justice tends to focus less on desert and 
retribution and more on utilitarian theories of deterrence and incapacitation.43 
Deterrence is often categorized as either “general,” meaning punishment aimed at 
deterring anyone in the population from committing crimes, or “specific,” meaning 
punishment aimed at deterring a particular offender or class of offenders from 
committing crimes.44 In this sense, recidivist punishment is more likely to fall under 
 
36  See ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 54–55; VON HIRSCH, supra note 32, at 72.  
37  See generally Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality and Progressive Loss of Mitigation: Further 
Reflections, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 
1 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2014). 
38  See supra text accompanying note 9; infra Section III.A. 
39  ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 58. 
40  Julian V. Roberts, The Future of State Punishment: The Role of Public Opinion in Sentencing, in 
RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST—HAS IT A FUTURE? 101, 118 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011).  
41  See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique of 
California's Habitual Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 193, 205 (1990); see also Jesper Ryberg, 
Retributivism and Multiple Offending, 11 RES PUBLICA 213 (2005). 
42  See ROBERTS, supra note 2, at 70; George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 CRIM. JUST. 
ETHICS, no.2, 1982, at 54, 58–59. 
43  Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and 
Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 42 (2007) (“[I]t is antidesert crime control theories—most 
notably deterrence and incapacitation—that have had the greatest influence in recent criminal 
justice reforms.”). 
44  Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence, in 4 ACAD. FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19, 19–20 
(Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-
Criminal-Justice_Vol_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2ES-2VAU]. 





specific deterrence, as it aims to deter individuals with past criminal records from 
reoffending.45 Though it may be argued that if criminality can truly be habitual 
then deterrence would not be an effective strategy for combating it, proponents of 
the deterrent theory nonetheless claim that repeat offenders would commit even 
more crimes if they were not to some degree deterred by the presence of recidivist 
punishment.46 Critics of this deterrence theory take issue with the “heroic and 
unrealistic assumptions about ‘threat communication’” that such a theory 
requires.47 
The most straightforward explanation for recidivist sentencing—though 
somewhat bound up in the specific deterrence model—is its incapacitating function: 
the notion cited above that society must be protected from repeat offenders. This is 
the language employed by New York’s persistent felony offender enhancement: the 
nature of the prior offenses or the defendant’s history and character are such that 
an extended sentence with lifetime supervision would be in the public interest.48 
Noted criminologist Michael Tonry has identified multiple problems with this 
approach, the most persuasive of which is that as individuals age they are less 
likely to engage in crime; what Tonry calls the “residual career length” problem.49 
This means that the state is incapacitating allegedly dangerous repeat offenders 
precisely when they are less dangerous.50 Moreover, if it is really the “public 
 
45  See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992) (“States have a valid interest in deterring and 
segregating habitual criminals.”). 
46  “Hard-core recidivist criminals” may offend whatever we do, but they would commit far 
more offences if they had carte blanche to do so. Deterrent effectiveness is always a matter 
of degree, and one who eventually offends may none the less have been deterred to some 
degree, in the sense that the range of circumstances in which he would offend is restricted. 
The threat is thus not pointless, and the violence it involves may be justifiable. 
Anthony Ellis, A Deterrence Theory of Punishment, 53 PHIL. Q. 337, 350 (2003). 
47  Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 29 (2006) 
(“Mandatory minimum penalties including three-strikes laws are nothing more than efforts to 
deter crime through penalty increases. The clear weight of the evidence, not surprisingly given 
what we know about severity increases generally, is that they are seldom if ever crime 
preventatives.”) (citations omitted). 
48  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 2018); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 400.20 (McKinney 2018). 
49  Tonry, Purposes and Functions, supra note 47, at 31 (“There may be other justifications for 
confining such offenders for extended periods; but from an incapacitative perspective, such 
sentences are expensive, inefficient, and largely ineffective.”); see also Dana Goldstein, Too Old 
to Commit Crime? Why People Age out of Crime, and What It Could Mean for How Long We Put 
Them Away, MARSHALL PROJECT: JUST. LAB (March 20, 2015, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/20/too-old-to-commit-crime. 
50  JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL 
REFORM 192–93 (2017). Furthermore, there stands what Tonry calls the “multiple offense 
paradox,” whereby offenders charged with multiple offenses concurrently get “bulk discounts,” 
reducing the time served for each particular offense, while those charged as recidivists get 
enhancements for their past crimes. Michael Tonry, Solving the Multiple Offense Paradox, in 
SENTENCING MULTIPLE CRIMES 241 (Jesper Ryberg, Julian V. Roberts & Jan W. de Keijser eds., 
2018). 





interest” that is to be served by such sentences, should it not be the jury—the 
democratic arm of the judicial branch51—making determinations about what that 
is? This is the question Apprendi was intended to answer.52 
II. APPRENDI AND ITS PROGENY 
The rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey seems clear on its face: “Other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”53 Yet despite its apparently simplicity, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly faced new scenarios demanding the rule’s interpretation. 
Despite all these challenges, the exception contained in the first clause of the rule, 
“the fact of a prior conviction,” has remained intact. 
As noted at the outset, the Apprendi Court linked this exception to its 
decision in Almendarez-Torres two years earlier.54 This link, however, was not as 
simple as carving out a decisive exception; instead, it warranted nearly four pages 
of explanation.55 The petitioner in Almendarez-Torres was caught reentering the 
United States after having been previously deported and was then sentenced under 
an enhancement provision for those whose deportation was due to prior convictions 
for aggravated felonies.56 He challenged the conviction on the grounds that the prior 
conviction was an element of the crime, and therefore should have been charged in 
the indictment.57 The Court ruled against him, saying that the enhancement was 
merely a “penalty provision” and need not be charged.58 However, the majority 
opinion concluded that because the prior convictions had been admitted in the 
guilty plea, the court “express[ed] no view on whether some heightened standard of 
proof might apply to sentencing determinations that bear significantly on the 
severity of sentence.”59 
By contrast, the central issue in Apprendi was which standard of proof 
applied. In that case, a white man fired a gun into the home of an African American 
family and ultimately received an enhanced sentence pursuant to New Jersey’s hate 
 
51  See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (“Just as suffrage ensures the people's 
ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their 
control in the judiciary.”); see also Jeffrey Abramson, Four Models of Jury Democracy, 90 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 861, 862 (2015). 
52  See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 8 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 
275 (2001) (“Apprendi deals with factors that do not define the line between law-abiding citizen 
and criminal; instead, they define the line between criminal and worse criminal.”). 
53  530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
54  See supra text accompanying notes 3–5. 
55  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487–91.  
56  Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). 
57  Id. at 227. 
58  Id. at 247. 
59  Id. at 248. 





crimes law.60 However, the indictment had not mentioned the hate crimes law, and 
the court imposed the enhancement after an evidentiary hearing before the judge, 
decided by a preponderance of the evidence.61 The Court reversed, finding this 
procedure in violation of due process and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.62 
The opinion in Apprendi emphasized that Mr. Almendarez-Torres had 
admitted the prior convictions in his plea and only contested their use for an 
enhancement on the grounds that they had not been included in the indictment.63 
Therefore, “no question concerning the right to a jury trial or the standard of proof 
that would apply to a contested issue of fact was before the Court [in Almendarez-
Torres].”64 This point is crucial, as the prior convictions exception may itself not 
withstand such a challenge. As the Court went on to say, “it is arguable that 
Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our 
reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested.”65 However, 
because it was not at issue in Mr. Apprendi’s conviction, the Court decided to 
preserve the exception.66 
Though continuing to sidestep the recidivist issue, the cases following in the 
Apprendi line have certainly dealt with weighty matters. Among the earliest 
challenges was Ring v. Arizona, where the Court invalidated the Arizona death 
penalty procedure, under which the jury pronounced a defendant guilty of murder 
but the judge alone determined the aggravating factors for imposing the death 
sentence.67 Arizona attempted to argue that the jury’s verdict exposed the 
defendant to either death or life imprisonment, and the aggravating factors were 
merely an exercise of judicial discretion.68 The Court refuted this attempt by saying 
the death penalty statute “explicitly cross-references the statutory provision 
requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death 
penalty,” demonstrating that the judge’s factfinding was essential.69 The Court’s 
holding was later reaffirmed in Hurst v. Florida, which invalidated Florida’s death 
penalty scheme on precisely the same grounds.70 
The next major milestone came in Blakely v. Washington, where the Court 
held that a defendant who pled guilty to kidnapping could not receive a sentence 
enhancement due only to a judge’s finding of “deliberate cruelty,” absent facts found 
 
60  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. 
61  Id. at 470–71. 
62  Id. at 497. 
63  Id. at 488. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. at 489–90. 
66  Id. 
67  536 U.S. 584 (2002).  
68  Id. at 603–04. 
69  Id. at 604. 
70  136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  





by or admitted to a jury.71 Some commentators immediately read this decision as 
bolstering the prior convictions exception by drawing a line between characteristics 
of the offense, which a jury must find as part of guilt, and characteristics of the 
offender, which a judge may find pursuant to sentencing.72 However, the majority 
opinion in Blakely made clear:  
Whether the judge’s authority to impose an enhanced sentence 
depends on finding a specified fact (as in Apprendi), one of several 
specified facts (as in Ring), or any aggravating fact (as here), it 
remains the case that the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the 
sentence. The judge acquires that authority only upon finding some 
additional fact.73 
In light of this decision, the Court was soon faced with a massive choice. The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines looked very similar to the Washington scheme 
struck down in Blakely, and even the dissenters  knew that a challenge to that 
system was inevitable.74 This premonition was correct, and in United States v. 
Booker, a strange split decision led to an excision of certain parts of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines that transformed them from mandatory to advisory.75 In two 
consolidated cases, trial court judges refused (on the basis of Blakely) to employ the 
guidelines in a way that would involve their own fact-finding at the sentencing 
phase; in the first part of the Booker opinion, the Court affirmed those decisions.76 
In the later, remedial part of the decision, a majority made up of the four dissenters 
from the first part of the opinion plus Justice Ginsburg (the only one to join both 
controlling opinions), found that the guidelines were severable, and that selective 
excision to remove the mandatory character of the guidelines was the appropriate 
course.77 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now only advisory.78 
The Court did eventually begin to tackle prior criminal conduct in light of 
Apprendi, but only in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).  The 
ACCA requires a court to impose an enhanced sentence on anyone who is convicted 
of a felony following three previous convictions for a “violent felony.”79 In cases such 
as Shepard v. United States80 and Descamps v. United States,81 the Court faced the 
 
71  542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).  
72  See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 89 (2004). 
73  542 U.S. at 305. 
74  Id. at 325–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If anything, the structural differences that do exist 
make the Federal Guidelines more vulnerable to attack.”). 
75  543 U.S. 220, 227 (2006). 
76  Id. 
77  Id. at 245. 
78  The contours of the current, advisory role of the Guidelines are outside the scope of this Note. See 
generally Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing After Booker, 48 CRIME & JUST. 137 (2019). 
79  18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
80  544 U.S. 13 (2005). 
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question of how to apply convictions under state criminal statutes. ACCA employs 
“generic” offenses to define “violent felony” as predicates for purposes of a 
sentencing enhancement under what the Court calls the “categorical approach”: 
[Courts] compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the 
defendant’s conviction with the elements of the “generic” crime—i.e., 
the offense as commonly understood. The prior conviction qualifies as 
an ACCA predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same as, or 
narrower than, those of the generic offense.82  
The upshot of these cases is that, due to concerns about violating the Sixth 
Amendment as expressed in Apprendi, judges must employ this restrictive 
categorical approach to identifying those state crimes and their elements.83 This 
confirms that a sentencing judge can examine a statute but cannot consider the 
factual circumstances of a prior conviction.84  
The Court has held that the Apprendi rule applies equally to facts which 
expose a defendant to an increased maximum or minimum penalty. Harris v. 
United States, decided shortly after the rule was announced, initially exempted 
mandatory minimums.85 But when presented with an opportunity to reconsider, 
even Justice Breyer—who concurred in the Harris decision—eventually joined the 
majority to overrule Harris in light of subsequent developments.86 The Court in 
Alleyne held that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an 
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”87  
This not only had the effect of overruling Harris, but also brought the Court’s 
jurisprudence on minimum sentences in line with cases involving an increase in 
statutory maximums, like Apprendi itself. In Cunningham v. California, for 
example, the Court invalidated California’s Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL) on 
the ground that it allowed judges to find aggravating facts which exposed a 
defendant to an elevated sentence beyond the otherwise prescribed statutory 
maximum.88 In doing so, the Court refused to defer to the California Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the DSL as merely allowing the judge to engage in 
traditional discretionary sentence selection, and read the statute in its plain 
language: requiring the aggravating factors to impose the enhancement.89 
Nonetheless, since Apprendi, the Court has yet to see a viable challenge to a state 
recidivist scheme that retains judicial fact-finding. 
 
82  Id. at 257. 
83  See id. at 277–78. 
84  See id. at 269. 
85  536 U.S. 545 (2002). 
86  See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013); see also infra notes 182–84 and accompanying 
text.  
87  Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103. 
88  549 U.S. 270 (2007). 
89  Id. at 289. 





III. PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER ENHANCEMENTS IN NEW YORK 
This Note focuses on New York because that state has a central place in the 
history of American recidivist punishment. As historian David J. Rothman explains: 
The New York Supreme Court in the pre-Revolutionary era regularly 
sentenced criminals to death . . . . [T]he court had frequent recourse to 
the scaffold—for those convicted of pickpocketing, burglary, robbery, 
counterfeiting, horse-stealing, and grand larceny as well as murder. 
Most of the petty criminals were second and third offenders . . . . 
[R]ecidivism inevitably brought the gallows.90 
New York was also the first state to pass a recidivist statute after the 
revolution, imposing additional punishment for second-time offenders in 1796.91 The 
law was adjusted over the following century, as it regularly posed problems for 
prison officials bent on reform, particularly by causing overcrowding.92 In 1926, 
New York again set the tone for other states by enacting the infamous Baumes 
Law,93 which mandated a life term for any offender with a record of three prior 
felonies, regardless of the circumstances of any of the convictions.94 At least twenty-
three other states followed New York’s lead in adopting similar laws, and this era 
has been called the “zenith” of the recidivist statute’s popularity.95  
 
90  DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW 
REPUBLIC 51 (1971).  
91  See LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, COMPRISING THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE ACTS OF THE 
LEGISLATURE, SINCE THE REVOLUTION, FROM THE FIRST TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, INCLUSIVE 
291 (Thomas Greenleaf, 1797), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.nysstatutes/lwsneyo 
0003&i=307; see also People v. Morse, 465 N.E.2d 12, 18–19 (N.Y. 1984) (describing history of 
persistent felony offender statutes in the state); Michael G. Turner, Jody L. Sundt, Brandon K. 
Applegate & Francis T. Cullen, “Three Strikes and You're Out” Legislation: A National 
Assessment, 59 FED. PROB. 16, 17 (1995) (“The New York law [in 1797] mandated that 
individuals convicted of their second felony be sentenced to prison ‘at hard labor or in solitude, or 
both, for life.’”). 
92  See Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865–1965, in THE OXFORD HISTORY 
OF THE PRISON, supra note 17, at 151, 156 (noting that in the 1890s the Elmira Reformatory 
“held two times as many inmates as it was designed for,” largely because it “had been intended 
for first offenders between sixteen and thirty-one years of age, but in practice recidivists always 
constituted one-third of the inmates”). 
93  Clarence Darrow connected the passage of the Baumes Law to prohibition: 
The open violence, the crowded prisons, the state of anarchy that prohibition has brought 
about led to a mad and senseless crusade against crime. New Penal Statutes were passed, 
prison terms were lengthened, courts and juries, in obedience to the mania, convicted 
defendants almost indiscriminately. Many innocent persons were sent to prison and 
executed in this carnival of hate. Such infamous acts as the Baumes Law—providing that 
a fourth offender should be sent to prison for life—were passed in most of the States. 
CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 335–36 (DA CAPO PRESS 1996) (1932).  
94  Turner et al., supra note 91, at 17.  
95  JOHN PRATT, GOVERNING THE DANGEROUS: DANGEROUSNESS, LAW, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 35 (1998) 
 





The enthusiasm for enhancing sentences of those with prior convictions 
coincided with a technological advancement that allowed the state to identify people 
almost as accurately as they had done with branding in an earlier age: 
fingerprinting.96 Again, New York was at the forefront of fingerprint identification, 
even sending a delegation to the 1904 World’s Fair to give a demonstration on the 
technique.97 By the time the Baumes Law passed, the state had already identified 
tens of thousands of individuals in this manner.98 When Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller appointed the Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and 
Criminal Code in the 1960s to update the state’s criminal laws, it codified the 
current persistent felony offender statute.99 New York also led the charge here, 
predating alterations to recidivist enhancements that other states and the federal 
government would undertake in the next decade.100  
The current recidivist regime authorizes a trial judge to impose a sentence of 
fifteen years to life when the defendant is found to be a persistent felony offender 
deserving the enhancement,101 even if the current charge carries a penalty as low as 
one year, or in some circumstances even less.102 The result is that one in five 
prisoners in New York are serving life or functional life sentences.103 Moreover, the 
racial disparity in these sentences are obvious: 55.8% of these inmates are Black, 
24.7% are Latino, but just 17.3% are White.104 This despite the fact that African 
 
(quoting George K. Brown, Note, The Treatment of the Recidivist in the United States, 23 
CANADIAN B. REV. 640, 642 (1945)); see also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: 
PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 92 (2007) (describing the expansion 
of “Baumes Laws” to other jurisdictions).  
96  Nancy J. King, Sentencing and Prior Convictions: The Past, the Future, and the End of the Prior 
Convictions Exception to Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 531–32 (2014) (“[B]y the end of the 
1930s fingerprinting was the dominant method for identification.”).  
97  SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL 
IDENTIFICATION 137–38 (2002).  
98  King, supra note 96, at 532. 
99  People v. Morse, 465 N.E.2d 12, 19 (N.Y. 1984) 
100  See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975-2025, at 57–62 
(2016). 
101  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10(2) (McKinney 2018). 
102  When a person, other than a second or persistent felony offender, is sentenced for a class D 
or class E felony, and the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime 
and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of 
imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose an indeterminate 
or determinate sentence, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and 
fix a term of one year or less. 
§ 70.00(4) (emphasis added). 
103  See ASHLEY NELLIS, SENTENCING PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND 
LONG-TERM SENTENCES 7 tbl.1 (2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/Still-Life.pdf. 
104  See id. at 15 tbl.4. 





Americans are only 17.6% of the state’s population, Latinos 19.2%, and Whites 
55.4%—a particularly striking juxtaposition.105   
A. The Statutory Scheme 
The persistent felony offender scheme in New York is governed by two 
statutory provisions: Penal Law section 70.10, which defines the status and the 
authorized sentence, and Criminal Procedure Law section 400.20, which lays out 
the steps a court must follow to impose the sentence. Section 70.10 is divided into 
two subsections, the first of which says that “[a] persistent felony offender is a 
person . . . who stands convicted of a felony after having previously been convicted 
of two or more felonies.”106 Subsection one lays out further definitions and 
distinguishes this provision from the separate persistent violent felony offender 
statute.107 Subsection two of section 70.10 describes the authorized sentence:  
When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal 
procedure law, that a person is a persistent felony offender, and when 
it is of the opinion that the history and character of the defendant and 
the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that 
extended incarceration and life-time supervision will best serve the 
public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of 
imprisonment authorized . . . for the crime of which such person 
presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment 
[of fifteen years to life] for a class A-I felony. In such event the reasons 
for the court’s opinion shall be set forth in the record.108 
The language of this provision clearly requires findings that the defendant meets 
the definition and additional findings about the defendant’s character, nature of the 
prior conduct, and the public interest. It also establishes that the enhancement is 
itself discretionary, and the sentencing court “may,” not “must” or “shall,” impose 
the increased sentence. It is important to note, however, that for the sentence to be 
valid, it must be supported by findings in the record. 
The procedural section crystallizes these points even further. In its opening 
provision defining applicability, the criminal procedure law says that the persistent 
felony offender sentence “may not be imposed unless” the defendant meets the 
definition and his or her history and character and the nature of the prior offense 
have been evaluated by the judge.109 Crucially, the statute empowers the judge to 
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initiate proceedings for an enhancement under this statute, not the prosecutor.110 In 
practice, however, many hearings under the scheme do arise from a motion by the 
state.111 If a judge decides that there are reasons for the enhancement, an order is 
filed with the clerk and notice is sent to the defendant, defense counsel, and district 
attorney, setting a date for a hearing and spelling out the relevant prior convictions 
and the factors influencing the history and nature finding.112 
Under this procedural section, not one but two separate hearings may be 
necessary to impose the sentence. In every case where the court seeks to impose the 
enhancement, it must hold a preliminary hearing where the defendant has the 
opportunity to controvert either the fact of the prior convictions or the background 
and criminal conduct factors warranting imposition of the sentence.113 If the 
defendant declines to contest the sentence enhancement on either ground, or the 
court determines that any evidence the defendant does have to present would not 
affect its decision, no further hearing is required.114 However, if the defendant does 
wish to controvert the findings—and can present relevant evidence—then a second 
hearing may be held.115 In either situation, no jury is present, and though the fact of 
the prior convictions must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, “the defendant’s 
history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct 
may be established by any relevant evidence . . . regardless of admissibility under 
the exclusionary rules of evidence, and the standard of proof with respect to such 
matters shall be a preponderance of the evidence.”116 
After the hearings, in order to authorize the sentence, the judge must enter 
findings into the record. If only the preliminary hearing has been conducted, and 
the “the uncontroverted allegations in the statement of the court are sufficient” to 
meet both subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 70.10, “the court may enter a finding 
that the defendant is a persistent felony offender” and impose the enhanced 
sentence.117 Where the court has conducted the secondary hearing, at its conclusion, 
“the court must make a finding as to whether or not the defendant is a persistent 
felony offender and, upon a finding that he is such, must then make such findings of 
fact as it deems relevant to the question of whether a persistent felony offender 
 
110  When information available to the court prior to sentencing indicates that the defendant 
is a persistent felony offender, and when, in the opinion of the court, the available 
information shows that a persistent felony offender sentence may be warranted, the court 
may order a hearing to determine (a) whether the defendant is in fact a persistent felony 
offender, and (b) if so, whether a persistent felony offender sentence should be imposed. 
 Id. § 400.20(2). 
111  See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 833 N.E.2d 194, 195 (N.Y. 2005) (“The People moved for a persistent 
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sentence is warranted.”118 The text of the statute itself clearly refers to findings of 
fact made by the judge. Throughout the process, the court may decide sua sponte to 
suspend the hearings but may not enhance the sentence, “unless the court 
recommences the proceedings and makes the necessary findings.”119 
B. The Response to Apprendi 
As a result of this statutory scheme, in order to impose the enhancement on a 
defendant, specific findings must be made by the court related to the history and 
character of the defendant and the nature of the past criminal conduct.120 Absent 
such findings, appellate courts have regularly reversed and remanded for 
resentencing, stretching back to the earliest days of this statutory scheme.121 
Moreover, trial courts will refrain from imposing the enhanced sentence if the first 
prong of section 70.10—the fact of prior convictions—is met, but the second—the 
history, character, and nature—is not.122  
Yet the Court of Appeals of New York has repeatedly resisted overturning the 
statute in the years since Apprendi was decided, as new challenges to the scheme 
follow whenever the Supreme Court takes another step at expanding that holding. 
The first challenge arose mere months after Apprendi, when a defendant found 
guilty of sexual assault and endangering a minor received an enhanced sentence 
under the persistent felony offender statute.123 In applying the Supreme Court’s 
new rule, the Court of Appeals in People v. Rosen held that section 70.10 had two 
distinct parts, and that “[o]nly after it has been established that defendant is a 
twice prior convicted felon may the sentencing court, based on the preponderance of 
the evidence . . . determine whether actually to issue an enhanced sentence.”124 As 
 
118  Id. § 400.20(9) (emphasis added). 
119  Id. § 400.20(10). 
120  It should be noted of course that the federal sentencing factors also take into account the “history 
and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and of course the defendant’s 
criminal history score. However, after Apprendi and Booker, those factors are used only to 
evaluate the advisory sentencing guidelines range, see supra note 78, and are cabined by the 
statutory maximum penalty for the instant offense; whereas in New York, as explored in the 
previous section, they are employed to impose an enhancement beyond the statutory maximum.  
121  See People v. Murdaugh, 833 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (“The sentencing court's 
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(N.Y. 2007); see also People v. Garcia, 700 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); People v. 
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N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). 
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such, the court held that the fact of two or more prior felony convictions is the “sole 
determina[nt]” to expose a defendant to the sentence enhancement, and that in 
making findings regarding the history, nature, and public interest, “the sentencing 
court is thus only fulfilling its traditional role—giving due consideration to agreed-
upon factors—in determining an appropriate sentence within the permissible 
statutory range.”125 No Judges of the Court of Appeals dissented from the decision.  
Commentators immediately saw the contradiction here, and some noted that 
either Apprendi or the New York sentence enhancement would have to give way 
eventually.126 Yet the Court of Appeals doggedly stuck to its interpretation four 
years later in People v. Rivera.127 In this case, the defendant had been convicted of a 
felony carrying a four-year maximum sentence, but the court imposed the persistent 
felony offender enhancement and sentenced him to fifteen years to life.128 Despite 
taking note of the recent expansions in the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence in Blakely and Booker, the Court of Appeals upheld the sentence, 
reasoning that because the Supreme Court had not expressly overruled 
Almendarez-Torres, the prior convictions exception still stood.129 The Court of 
Appeals could only achieve this by reinforcing the statutory construction used in 
Rosen and concluding that the defendant’s two predicate felonies were the 
“necessary and sufficient conditions” for imposition of the sentence enhancement.130  
However, there was a dissent in this case from Chief Judge Kaye, who had 
concurred in the court’s judgment in Rosen. Her position was that in light of 
subsequent developments (particularly in Ring v. Arizona) and due to the stilted 
construction of “necessary and sufficient conditions,” the statute could no longer 
survive constitutional challenge.131 Judge Ciparick, too, filed a dissent along much 
 
125  Id.  
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the Impractical Nature and Uncertain Future of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 103 (2002). 
Undertaking this sentencing procedure is appropriate for a court, as it is consistent with 
the traditional role of a judge. Even so, it conflicts with the explicit holding of Apprendi. 
Under the Supreme Court's rule, a court should not make these factual findings beyond 
the existence or nonexistence of a prior conviction. This contradiction between the need for 
judicial participation and the Apprendi standard was the challenge faced by the Court of 
Appeals in Rosen. 
Id. at 113. See generally Joseph E. Fahey, Discretionary Persistent Felony Offender Sentencing in 
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the same lines.132 Their positions went unheeded, and as the U.S. Supreme Court 
continued to expand the coverage of the Apprendi rule, New York stuck to its 
position.133  
The next challenge to the statute came after the Supreme Court invalidated 
California’s determinate sentencing law in Cunningham.134 Continuing to insist 
that New York’s scheme required only the finding of the predicate felonies to 
“expose” defendant to the higher penalty, the Court of Appeals held: 
Unlike the sentencing schemes in Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, Booker and 
Cunningham, all of which effectively provided for judicial fact-finding 
of an element(s) of an offense as a prerequisite to enhancing a sentence 
beyond the relevant sentencing range, the New York sentencing 
scheme, after a defendant is deemed eligible to be sentenced as a 
persistent felony offender, requires that the sentencing court make a 
qualitative judgment about, among other things, the defendant’s 
criminal history and the circumstances surrounding a particular 
offense in order to determine whether an enhanced sentence, under 
the statutorily prescribed sentencing range, is warranted.135 
Thus, the artificial barrier between the two required prongs of the persistent felony 
offender enhancement was preserved.136 
During this time, the federal courts in New York were not silent on the issue 
and saw some tension between judges at the district court level and those in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In particular, Judge John 
Gleeson in the Eastern District of New York seemed to take a special interest in the 
sentencing scheme, twice granting habeas petitions in cases involving the persistent 
felony offender enhancement, and twice being reversed on appeal.137 The second of 
 
Legislature, that not every two-time (nonviolent) recidivist is eligible, without more, to be 
sentenced to an indeterminate life term. Only some are. 
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these cases, Portalatin v. Graham, still governs the practice of the Second Circuit 
and held that it was bound by the New York Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the 
statute.138 
Shortly after the Second Circuit handed down the Portalatin decision, the 
New York Court of Appeals had yet another chance to revisit its interpretation of 
the statute. Two cases decided on the same day resulted in the court choosing to 
“decline defendant’s invitation” to do so.139 The second of those cases, People v. 
Battles, came with another stinging dissent, this time from Chief Judge Lippman, 
who noted that the Second Circuit had been somewhat hamstrung by the 
“extraordinarily deferential review standard applicable in federal habeas 
proceedings,” and thus Portalatin “hardly places a federal imprimatur upon our 
Apprendi jurisprudence.”140 He articulated that courts in Connecticut, Maine, Ohio, 
Minnesota, Hawaii, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Arizona had all tackled their 
recidivist statutes in response to Apprendi.141 He referred back to the dissents in 
Rivera, and proceeded to say that the court’s continued mangling of the statutory 
text was no different than the California court’s attempt to misread its laws, 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Cunningham.142 However, the interpretation 
survived Judge Lippman’s dissent, too.  
i. The Comparison to Other States 
Chief Judge Lippman was right: in other states, the highest courts have 
recognized that their similar procedures for recidivist sentencing violate Apprendi 
and must be overturned. The most prominent example is Connecticut, which in 
2007 struck down a nearly identical statute as a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.143 The statute at issue first required a finding that a defendant met 
the definition for “persistent dangerous felony offender” through proof of predicate 
felonies, and then a secondary finding that “the court is of the opinion that such 
person’s history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person’s 
criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will 
best serve the public interest.”144 This language is nearly identical to New York’s 
 
138  We must presume that the New York Court of Appeals meant what it said: the statutory 
directive to consider the history and character of the defendant, and the nature and 
circumstances of his crime, is a procedural requirement that is only triggered once a judge 
is already authorized to impose the class A–I sentence. 
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current statute,145 and so the Supreme Court of Connecticut discussed the decisions 
in Rivera and Brown v. Greiner, but took the New York Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation at face value to establish a distinction between the two statutes.146 
To resolve the issue, the court excised the words “the court is of the opinion that” 
from the statutory text, which it said would make it clear that the jury, rather than 
the judge, had to rule on the defendant’s history and character, the nature of the 
prior offense, and the public interest.147 
Whereas Connecticut provides a handy comparison for its similarity, Indiana 
supplies an illustrative contrast for its dissimilarity. Indiana’s sentencing scheme, 
including its habitual offender law, had been in place since 1977 and though it had 
been tweaked by frequent minor amendments, 2005 marked a dramatic year in its 
history. First, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that the state’s judicial sentencing 
structure was unconstitutional due to its similarity to the Washington scheme 
struck down in Blakely.148 Indiana’s structure of presumptive fixed terms from 
which a sentencing judge could depart upward or downward based on aggravating 
or mitigating factors was, in the Indiana Supreme Court’s view, precisely what the 
Apprendi and Blakely decisions sought to abolish.149 Just two months before the 
New York Court of Appeals shrugged off the challenge to its scheme in the Rivera 
case, the Indiana Supreme Court humbly stated: “Whether [the Blakely decision] 
represents sound jurisprudence or policy is of no moment for us under the 
Supremacy Clause, and we cannot see any grounds for sustaining Indiana’s 
sentencing scheme given the Blakely holding.”150 The court held that Blakely 
established a “new rule of criminal procedure,” and that future decisions regarding 
any factors of the type envisioned by Blakely would have to be found by a jury in 
Indiana criminal courts.151 
The Indiana General Assembly thought this was the wrong approach, 
however, and took mere weeks to rewrite the entire sentencing scheme to fashion a 
more Booker-type remedy, rendering the Indiana sentencing ranges merely advisory 
rather than mandatory.152 This fix was approvingly cited in Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion in Cunningham as among those systems in which a state has chosen to 
allow a judge to exercise a great deal of discretion within a wide statutory range, 
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thus not implicating Sixth Amendment concerns.153 In fact, the remedy crafted by 
the Indiana Supreme Court in Smylie would have fit neatly into Justice Ginsburg’s 
other box for acceptable responses to Apprendi and Blakely, by retaining 
determinate sentencing but requiring all relevant facts to be proved to the jury.154 
More importantly, had the legislature preserved rather than overruled the 
Indiana Supreme Court’s remedy, it might in fact have been more reflective of the 
Indiana Constitution. Indiana is one of two states with a constitutional provision 
that arguably empowers a jury in a criminal case beyond even the bounds of the 
federal constitution: “In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to 
determine the law and the facts.”155 While the high court has ruled that this 
provision does not grant a right to jury nullification,156 the provision has posed an 
interesting difficulty in the realm of the habitual offender law. Since its modern 
inception in 1977, and continuing through the 2005 amendments, the Indiana 
habitual offender enhancement has always required a bifurcated proceeding in jury 
trials: after conviction, the jury reconvenes for a sentencing hearing with new 
instructions based on a separate document that alleges the prior convictions, 
appended to the main charging instrument.157 In holding that the jury retains the 
prerogative not to apply a habitual offender sentence even if the state succeeds in 
proving all of the required elements, the court noted that “the interplay between the 
habitual offender statute [and the constitutional provision] operates to give a jury 
latitude in defining habitual offender status in a way that it does not in defining 
guilt or innocence.”158 Therefore, in addition to requiring the jury to find the facts 
necessary to impose the sentence, it may also refuse to do so in the face of all the 
evidence necessary to impose the enhancement—quite a contrast to the state of the 
law in New York.  
ii. The Continued Adherence to Flawed Interpretation 
Recent developments in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence have spawned a 
new wave of challenges to the New York persistent felony offender law. Since the 
decisions in Alleyne, Descamps, and Hurst, two challenges have come before the 
New York Court of Appeals in consecutive years, and subsequently both were 
denied certiorari by the Supreme Court.159 The first of these two, People v. Prindle, 
confronted the Court of Appeals’ precedents head on, focusing particularly on the 
 
153  Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 (2007). 
154  See id. 
155  IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19; see also GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XI(a) (“In criminal cases, the 
defendant shall have a public and speedy trial by an impartial jury; and the jury shall be the 
judges of the law and the facts.”). 
156  Walden v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1182, 1187 (Ind. 2008). 
157  IND. CODE § 35-50-2-8 (2017). 
158  Walden, 895 N.E.2d at 1185 (citations omitted). 
159  See People v. Garvin, 88 N.E.3d 319 (N.Y. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 57 (2018); People v. 
Prindle, 80 N.E.3d 1026 (N.Y. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 514 (2017). 





effect of the Alleyne decision on the New York statute. The Court of Appeals held 
that since the persistent felony offender enhancement remains discretionary even 
once all hearings have been conducted and findings made, Alleyne did not pose a 
problem, because the mandatory minimum sentence to which the defendant was 
exposed had not been altered.160 No dissents were filed, though two judges took no 
part in the decision.161 
Another challenge was brought in People v. Garvin. This case contained a 
separate, key issue around whether the Fourth Amendment allowed a suspect to be 
arrested while standing in his doorway without a warrant or exigent circumstances, 
and that was the focus of much of the Court of Appeals’ opinion.162 Only in the final 
paragraph of the majority opinion did the court address the enhanced sentence, and 
it did so simply by saying Prindle was the governing precedent, with no further 
analysis.163 But Judge Fahey (one of those who had not participated in the Prindle 
decision) took the opportunity to write an opinion concurring in the Fourth 
Amendment holding while dissenting from the ruling on the Sixth Amendment 
question.164 His dissent was a stark statement that the persistent felony offender 
statute was flatly unconstitutional, as direct as any presented by a judge of the 
Court of Appeals: 
Being a “persistent felony offender” is, however, only one of two 
necessary conditions for the imposition of an enhanced sentence under 
the pertinent sentencing statute. The other necessary condition is that 
the sentencing court must be of the reasoned opinion, as set out in the 
sentencing record, “that the history and character of the defendant 
and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that 
extended incarceration and life-time supervision will best serve the 
public interest.” If the first necessary condition is met, but not the 
second, a persistent felony offender may not be given enhanced 
sentencing.165 
Judge Fahey then went on to rail at the “fundamentally flawed” analysis of the 
Rosen court and how it had wrongly been upheld, even as the Supreme Court 
consistently found new areas into which Apprendi extended.166 He concluded: 
“Exposing defendants to criminal penalties more severe than could be imposed 
based upon the jury verdict and prior convictions alone, without a jury making the 
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factual determinations necessary for the enhancement in punishment, is abhorrent 
not only to the Federal Constitution but also to basic justice.”167 
iii. The Inevitable Challenge 
These recent cases, Prindle and Garvin, have each been flawed in some way 
that excused the Supreme Court for denying certiorari. Prindle, as noted above, 
presented a question that would have required the Court to read the New York 
statute as increasing the mandatory minimum, thereby violating Alleyne. But this 
reading of the statute suffers from the fact that the procedural section clearly leaves 
the minimum sentence in the judge’s hands even after the findings on nature and 
history have been made.168 Garvin befell a different fate: because the Fourth 
Amendment question was simultaneously so novel and so narrow—and because it 
was the main focus of the Court of Appeals’ decision and both the petitioner’s and 
government’s briefs to the Supreme Court—denial of certiorari was similarly 
understandable.169 
So, under what circumstance would the court take up this challenge? As 
noted in Portalatin, and in Chief Judge Lippman’s dissent in Battles, a habeas case 
originating in federal court is unlikely due to the “extraordinarily deferential 
review” in such cases.170 In fact, Battles had some of the characteristics that might 
elevate a case in this area as it was, in the Chief Judge’s words, “a vivid example of 
impermissible judicial fact-finding,” because the judge’s finding “did not merely 
supplement the verdict, as ordinarily occurs in consequence of following the statute, 
it materially differed from, indeed conflicted with it.”171 But like Garvin, the case 
also presented another question on which the majority chose to focus—namely, the 
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propriety of imposing consecutive as opposed to concurrent sentences.172 It may be 
that the Supreme Court needs a case limited to the persistent felony offender 
statute, involving a similarly “vivid example,” yet stripped of all other contested 
issues. 
This necessity for a square and isolated presentation of the issue is due to the 
general practice of deference to the interpretation a state’s highest court gives to its 
state’s own statutes. The Supreme Court has a long history of deferring to such 
interpretations.173 However, it would be nonsensical to say that the Court cannot 
disagree with a patently elusive construction of a state statue—after all, this is 
precisely what the Court did in both Ring and Cunningham when faced with 
creative readings from a state’s high court.174 This exercise of power comports with 
the Court’s position as “the final arbiter of whether the Federal Constitution 
necessitate[s] the invalidation of a state law.”175 Moreover, as the federal courts 
have noted in this specific context, deference is only given to an interpretation of a 
statute’s ambiguous meaning, and not its “operative effect.”176 
Though this Note does not argue that the prior conviction exception itself will 
inevitably be overturned,177 evaluating the positions staked out by the members of 
the Court on that question helps guide an analysis of their likely votes on the New 
York law. It is, however, difficult to predict what result might be reached if 
certiorari were granted in a future case, due to recent changes in the Court’s 
makeup and the strange bedfellows that arise from cases in this arena. Justices 
Ginsburg and Thomas are on record as flatly opposed to the prior conviction 
exception.178 Justice Thomas recently wrote in an ACCA case: “The exception 
recognized in Almendarez–Torres for prior convictions is an aberration, has been 
seriously undermined by subsequent precedents, and should be reconsidered.”179 
Chief Justice Roberts, though he dissented in Alleyne, did join the majorities in 
Cunningham, Descamps, and Hurst, demonstrating that he is generally supportive 
of expanding (or at least reinforcing) the Apprendi rule. Justices Kagan and 
Sotomayor, as authors of the majority opinions in Descamps and Hurst, 
respectively, seem to be similarly inclined. In contrast, Justice Alito has been a 
consistent dissenter, even in the 8-1 decisions in Descamps and Hurst, and likely 
would be unswayed by any arguments to extend Apprendi. Though this calculation 
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would provide a tenuous five-justice majority, it is nonetheless worth examining the 
other members of the Court. 
Justice Breyer is difficult to read in these cases because of his early 
opposition to the Apprendi rule.180 But after his crucial contribution as the author of 
the remedial opinion in Booker, rendering advisory the guidelines of which he 
himself served as an author,181 his mind seems to have changed. He concurred in 
the judgment in Harris, finding that Apprendi did not apply to mandatory 
minimums.182 Yet later, Justice Breyer relented, joining the majority in Alleyne to 
overrule the Harris decision: “I continue to disagree with Apprendi. . . . But 
Apprendi has now defined the relevant legal regime for an additional decade.”183 
His reasoning points to the fact that he is unsatisfied with any “anomaly in 
Apprendi’s application,”184 which may open the door for his joining in striking down 
Almendarez-Torres (another decision he authored), as he has bent his views to the 
Court’s will in previous cases. 
This leaves the two newest additions to the Court. Justice Gorsuch not only 
assumed Justice Scalia’s seat, but seems to occupy a similar ideological space,185 
and Scalia was adamantly opposed to the prior conviction exception from its 
inception.186 Given the fact that Justice Gorsuch has already become known for his 
novel readings of cases and his use of originalism,187 he might even be tempted by a 
different reason to mount a challenge to the prior conviction exception—or at 
minimum to challenge the New York law—on double jeopardy grounds.188 With the 
Court’s recent consideration of the double jeopardy clause in relation to the 
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“separate sovereigns” doctrine in mind, this could potentially be a fruitful 
alternative avenue for a future litigant.189 
Justice Kavanaugh poses a difficulty, as he is fairly new to the Court. Some 
commentators have suggested that he has a particular interest in criminal 
sentencing and might be somewhat “pro-defense” in the general criminal context.190 
Others, however, note he has a particularly law-enforcement-oriented view of the 
Fourth Amendment, and that he testified in favor of a mandatory sentencing 
guidelines system in 2009.191 Critically for this analysis, his views differ in some 
ways from his predecessor, Justice Kennedy (a dissenter in Cunningham, though 
part of the majority in some cases), regarding the Apprendi rule.192 While far from 
certain, it is not inconceivable that either Justice Kavanaugh or Justice Gorsuch 
would support overturning New York’s persistent felony offender statute.  
CONCLUSION 
When ruling that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was incorporated 
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court opinion 
written by Justice White noted the “deep commitment of the Nation to the right of 
jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law 
enforcement.”193 This commitment reflects a broader skepticism of government 
power and a persistent belief in the positive influence provided by democratic 
participation in each branch of government. “Fear of unchecked power, so typical of 
our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the 
criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination 
of guilt or innocence.”194 The Sixth Amendment itself was the product of demand 
laid out by opponents to the ratification of the Constitution, who were assuaged by 
the guarantee of a forthcoming Bill of Rights, which would more specifically 
enshrine the jury trial right that every state constitution contained at the time of 
the founding.195 
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Recent developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence, spurred by the 
Apprendi decision, have led to a reexamination of this commitment. Despite that 
line of cases’ nominal expansion of the jury’s role in determining appropriate 
sentencing, the commitment is eroding all around, with a minute percentage of 
those facing criminal charges ever likely to see a jury at trial (however robust the 
debate over the causes of jury trials’ decline).196 The promise of Apprendi was to 
provide a role for the democratic check on the judiciary and ensure that the 
constitutional right to jury trial had real meaning for that small percentage of 
defendants who chose not to enter into plea bargains.  
Yet if that promise is to have meaning at all, it must be available to 
defendants seeking to challenge laws that run afoul of this constitutional right. 
Given that African Americans make up less than 15% of the general population but 
make up nearly 40% of persons convicted of a felony in state criminal justice 
systems, with similar gaps for other minority groups,197 there is clearly a problem of 
disparate impact with recidivist sentencing schemes. In New York specifically, 
sentencing disparity is particularly acute at the top end, with African Americans 
comprising 62% of those serving sentences of life without parole,198 despite being 
less than 20% of the state population.199 
New York’s persistent felony offender statute requires two steps: first, the 
court must find that the defendant has been convicted of two prior felonies; second, 
the judge, sitting alone and without a jury, must find that the nature of the prior 
offenses or the defendant’s history and character are such that an extended 
sentence with lifetime supervision would be in the public interest.200 While the 
judge retains the discretion to impose the normal sentence, without this second 
step, the enhanced sentence may not be imposed. The trial judge must, according to 
the statute, include factual findings in a decision to support the enhanced sentence.  
This scheme violates the Sixth Amendment, according to the rule announced 
in Apprendi, yet the New York Court of Appeals continues illogically to insist that 
only the first step of the analysis “exposes” a defendant to the enhanced sentence. 
No principles of deference or comity require the Supreme Court to accept this 
interpretation, and in order to protect the right to a jury trial, this scheme should be 
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overturned. Regardless of whether the prior conviction exception to the general rule 
stands, New York’s statute still must fall. 
There is of course the danger that altering this law would in fact harm 
criminal defendants. First, it may mean that the law transforms into a basic “three 
strikes” law, as the Court upheld in Ewing, qualifying anyone convicted of three 
felonies, no matter the circumstances, for a life sentence. Second, if the factual 
findings are retained but properly placed in the jury, it could have the unwanted 
effects of either prejudicing defendants in a single-phase trial or generating great 
expense to the system in bifurcated proceedings. Moreover, this change might 
simply shift discretion from judges to prosecutors. At the outset, a prosecutor may 
have the discretion to charge or not to charge all of the relevant conduct and factors, 
opening up a new avenue for plea bargaining power. Even efforts to replace this 
kind of prosecutorial or judicial discretion with algorithmic tools to “predict” an 
offender’s likelihood of recidivism (and thereby increase the severity of punishment) 
have also proven to be problematic, with many of the data inputs bearing the 
hallmarks of structural bias and racism.201 
All those dangers, though, must be weighed against the rights of the 
individual defendant as expounded by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution. The right to a jury trial is central to liberty and should not be treated 
lightly. As the Supreme Court has found this right to comprise greater protections 
from enhanced sentences of various types, courts and legislatures in states like 
Connecticut and Indiana have responded, while New York continues defiantly to 
retain its own laws. If a defendant is to be given an enhanced sentence in the public 
interest, let the democratic check on the judicial branch impose it. The process has 
been on a protracted collision course for two decades, and absent a reevaluation by 
the Court of Appeals or preemptive action by the legislature in the state capital, it 
must come to an end on First Street in the Nation’s Capital. 
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